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According to Article 1, Section eight of the United States Constitution the power 
to “declare war” rests solely with the legislature. While the Constitution identifies the 
president as “commander in chief of the army and navy,” only Congress can formally 
commit the United States to war. Most constitutional scholars agree that the Founding 
Fathers applied much the same system of checks and balances to foreign policy—and 
especially military policy—as they did to domestic affairs: the authority and 
responsibility were to be shared by the executive and the legislature. In practice, 
however, this power-sharing arrangement has not always worked out as planned. 
Presidents intent on flexing America’s military muscles have found ways of 
circumventing constitutional checks on their authority ever since George Washington’s 
administration, and this struggle over the direction of U.S. foreign policy has received 
considerable scholarly attention. 
Diplomatic historians have been particularly attracted to the cold war era, when 
the executive expanded its powers to previously undreamt-of lengths. Pervasive concerns 
about communism, a string of strong-willed presidents, and the threat of nuclear 
annihilation combined to increase presidential war-making power far beyond the 
constitutional provisions dealing with the formulation and execution of foreign policy. By 
the end of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon was able to widen America’s undeclared 
Vietnam War into neighboring Cambodia without once consulting Congress. 
Although the Cold War featured the most flagrant instances of the executive 
usurping congressional war-making power, Harry S. Truman, America’s first Cold War 
president, was not the first to unilaterally commit the nation to war. In fact, James 
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Monroe as early as 1818 reluctantly sanctioned General Andrew Jackson’s invasion of 
neighboring Spanish Florida in pursuit of raiding Seminole Indians. Monroe, an astute 
politician, recognized the widespread popularity of Jackson’s strike against the Indians 
and gave it his post facto approval. Congress was similarly disinclined to challenge 
Jackson, who had become something of a folk hero, and voted down measures for 
censure by wide margins. Thus did the White House and Capitol Hill tacitly 
acknowledged the president’s right to send the country to war. 
By the late 1940s Monroe’s sanctioning of Jackson’s invasion was only one of 
over 130 precedents cited by Harry Truman’s State Department to defend the right of the 
president to send the country to war without congressional approval. When confronted 
with communist aggression and handed a United Nations Resolution calling for aid after 
North Korea invaded South Korean sovereign territory, therefore, Truman had little 
trouble bypassing Congress and sending U.S. troops to South Korea’s defense in 1950.  
By labeling the Korean War a “police action,” Truman was able to sidestep the 
complicated process of obtaining congressional approval for a declaration of war, thereby 
unilaterally committing American forces to battle. It was a war in all but name. In the 
politically charged and fearful climate of the outset of the early Cold War, Truman’s 
actions in Korea, which amounted to a dramatic expansion of presidential power, were 
applauded, viewed by both Congress and the public as necessary for the defense of 
freedom from communist expansion.  
Truman inaugurated what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has termed the “Imperial 
Presidency,” a Cold War institution that would prove particularly durable. It reappeared 
in the late 1950’s when Congress granted President Dwight D. Eisenhower the power to 
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handle the Quemoy-Matsu crisis by any means necessary, up to and including the use of 
America’s nuclear arsenal to protect Formosa. Eisenhower’s subsequent nuclear saber-
rattling succeeded when the People’s Republic of China backed off, ending their artillery 
bombardment of the island. Following that diplomatic success, Eisenhower received 
unheard-of constitutional leeway when he asked for and was granted what would come to 
be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, a 1956 resolution that allowed him to commit U.S. 
troops to the defense of any Middle Eastern nation in danger of succumbing to 
communist aggression. The Imperial Presidency reached its zenith in 1964, when 
Congress overwhelmingly approved the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which gave President 
Lyndon Johnson the power to send American troops to Vietnam. 
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution bent the letter of the Constitution dangerously close 
to the breaking point, yet it was greeted with widespread support both in the houses of 
Congress and the popular media. Imperial presidents got things done and the country 
accepted it. By 1970, however, the national situation had changed. After six years of 
bloody, ineffective warfare, America—or more precisely the American Senate—had had 
enough. The Senate, struggling for the means to legislate a peace, introduced several bills 
and amendments aimed at scheduling a total troop withdrawal by late 1970. None of 
those resolutions passed. What did pass, however, was an amendment to the Foreign 
Military Sales Bill offered on the floor of the Senate by a junior senator from Kansas. 
The Dole Amendment was introduced as a political ploy to take the sting out of the repeal 
of a resolution that had justified so much of America’s involvement in Vietnam. The 
nature of its origin, however, ought not to obscure its significance. The debate 
surrounding the Dole Amendment, and the subsequent repeal of the Tonkin Gulf 
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Resolution, constituted the first public repudiation of the executive’s right to wage war 
without congressional approval, a precedent that had been become commonplace when 
Nixon took office. 
 The American press essentially ignored the Dole Amendment at the time of its 
passage, dismissing it as a political power play that had little tangible impact on U.S. 
foreign policy, and diplomatic historians have, by and large, followed suit. Most 
treatments of the “rise and fall” of the Imperial Presidency identify the War Powers Act 
of 1973 as the moment when Congress first contested the president’s self-proclaimed 
right to wage war single-handedly. But it was the Dole Amendment, and its surrounding 
debate, that marked the real watershed. From that point onward, until the inauguration of 
Ronald Reagan over a decade later, Congress would progressively rein in an executive 
branch that had far exceeded the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. 
President Gerald R. Ford’s 1975 attempt to embroil the U.S. in a civil war in 
Angola serves as the perfect example of Congress’ newfound nerve with respect to 
foreign policy. Despite the Ford administration’s desperate attempts to obtain 
congressional sanction for its covert war in Angola, Congress, citing the bloated powers 
of the president and the need for Congress to superintend America’s foreign policy, 
denied Ford’s request in a manner that would have been unthinkable in the Truman, 
Eisenhower, or Johnson years. Congress was finally living up to its responsibilities, and, 
in the process, exerting a much-needed restraining influence on the adventurers in the 
White House. 
If the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution represented the pinnacle of 
presidential war-making power in the twentieth century, its repeal signaled the decline of 
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that power. While many books and articles have been written analyzing the powerful 
sequence of circumstances that led Congress to grant Johnson such sweeping authority in 
1964, the 1970 repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution has received comparatively little 
attention. This thesis proposes to redress that shortfall in literature. 
Chapter One 
 
The President’s Precedent 
 
 
Unprecedented Action: James Monroe and Spanish Florida 
 
The passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on August 4, 1964 represented the 
height of the executive’s long ascendancy over its legislative counterpart. The 
Resolution, which amounted to Congress’ conscious repudiation of its constitutional 
power to control the United States’ overseas troop commitments, had severe 
consequences. Although extreme in its scope, it was by no means the first time Congress 
had given the executive authority it was not supposed to have. In fact, the precedent for 
Congress’ abdication of its own power had been set as far back as 1818. 
 By the beginning of the nineteenth century it looked as if the Constitution had 
successfully separated the powers of foreign policy between the executive and legislative 
branches. The president was commander in chief of the armed forces and strategic 
decisions were his alone to make. Congress, on the other hand, held the purse strings 
necessary for military appropriations and the power to declare, or make, war. Congress 
committed troops and the president commanded troops. Yet, by 1818, the second year of 
destructive raids on the southern United States by Seminole Indians based in Spanish 
Florida, President James Monroe decided his constitutional powers were too narrow. 
Monroe ordered General Andrew Jackson to pursue the raiding Seminoles into Spanish 
Florida, a violation of Spanish sovereign territory and an ostensible act of war. Instead of 
requesting a congressional declaration of war, Monroe decided not to consult Congress, 
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claiming, instead, that “the United States have a right to pursue their enemy on a 
principle of self-defense.”1   
General Jackson, however, did more than simply pursue a band of Seminole 
Indians. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. points out, “once in Florida, Jackson was soon 
fighting Spaniards and hanging Englishmen – actions that might conceivably embroil the 
country in serious war.”2 That a serious war was averted amounted to a diplomatic 
miracle. Henry Clay, a Kentucky senator and known enemy of General Jackson, declared 
on the Senate floor that “neither General Jackson nor the president has the power to 
authorize hostility. The power to declare war is lodged solely in the Congress.” Clay 
entreated the Senate not to “shrink from our duty,” and he called on Congress to “assert 
our constitutional powers, and vindicate this sacred instrument of government from 
military violation.”3  
 Clay’s stirring words, however, failed to sway the Senate. Jackson’s actions were 
incredibly popular with the general public, and he returned to Tennessee amidst a chorus 
of cheers.4 Furthermore, John Quincy Adams, then secretary of state, rushed to Jackson’s 
aid, claiming that there was no doubt that “defensive acts of hostility may be authorized 
by the Executive” and that “everything [Jackson] did was defensive; [and] as such it was 
neither war against Spain nor a violation of the Constitution.”5 Adams’s opinion, though 
it did not become standard operating procedure for another hundred and thirty years, 
carried the day in this case and represented a potentially dangerous repudiation of the 
                                                 
1 Cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973) 
p. 26. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Cited in HS571: History of United States Foreign Relations, Part One: American Revolution to 1920, Seth 
Jacobs, Instructor. 
4 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
1969) p. 170. 
5 Cited in ibid., p. 27. 
 11 
legislative branch’s constitutional authority to keep America out of war. The 
government’s refusal to censure either Jackson or Monroe amounted to a tacit 
endorsement of Monroe’s unilateral actions. 6  
 
Cold War as Catalyst: Harry Truman and Korea 
 
 By the 1950s, both the national and international climate had changed 
significantly. America had suffered through two world wars and undergone a drastic 
transformation in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches as a 
result of its protracted war against Germany and Japan. The guns were now quiet but the 
balance of power remained heavily weighted towards the executive and, consequently, a 
postwar congressional impulse to curb the power of the expanded presidency emerged. 
Congress began the battle to curtail President Harry S. Truman’s power by thwarting his 
domestic policy, passing legislation despite his veto, and ensuring that his Fair Deal 
remained more a dream than a legislative reality. Nor was Congress content with merely 
attacking Truman. In Schlesinger’s words, “[a]s Congress after the Civil War had 
repudiated the Lincolnian Presidency by impeaching Andrew Johnson, as Congress after 
the First World War had repudiated the Wilsonian Presidency by endorsing [Warren] 
Harding and normalcy, so Congress after the Second World War repudiated Franklin D. 
Roosevelt by recommending the 22nd Amendment and restricting all future Presidents to 
two terms.”7 The presidency, in its inflated World War Two incarnation, was under siege. 
In spite of this postwar drive, however, Truman managed to dramatically elongate the 
                                                 
6 Schlesinger, p. 26. 
7 Ibid., p. 127. 
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presidential reach by playing the one trump card history had never before dealt a postwar 
president: the cold war. 
 As opposed to the end of the Civil War or First World War, the years following 
World War Two constituted a time of worldwide threat. Schlesinger maintains that the 
cold war, with its “uncertain definitions and its shifting boundaries[,] appeared to create 
unprecedented problems for foreign policy.” The threat of instant annihilation, an 
unheard-of fear before 1945, demanded the government have the means to instantly 
respond and appeared to corroborate and legitimize the rapidly growing powers of the 
presidency. Despite its successes in rolling back Truman’s domestic policies and ensuring 
that Roosevelt’s unprecedented tenure in the Oval Office remained an exception, 
Congress was not able to fashion a congressional hegemony. In the realm of foreign 
relations, according to Schlesinger, “Congress was forced onto a terrain where many of 
its more thoughtful members now confessed to a sense of institutional inferiority, if not 
institutional guilt.”  
On June 24, 1950, the communist army of North Korea marched over the border 
into South Korea. The very next day, the United Nations Security Council proclaimed a 
“breach of the peace” and directed all member states to “render every assistance” to the 
UN in the implementation of its resolution.8 Truman, backed by precedent and a UN 
resolution calling for aid, was poised to commit U.S. troops and create the cold war 
incarnation of what Schlesinger has termed the Imperial Presidency – an executive with 
the power to make war. 
 In the fearful and ideologically explosive atmosphere of the early cold war, North 
Korea’s attack on South Korea (a country Truman had labeled as early as 1946 an 
                                                 
8 Ibid., p. 127-128. 
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“ideological battleground” that would make or break America’s position in Asia) 
demanded retaliation. Truman and his top officials were unable to visualize the North 
Korean invasion as anything but the first step in a Soviet master plan to gauge America’s 
tenacity before launching a global assault. Additionally, the president interpreted the 
attack as a personal slight and immediately determined to “hit them hard.”9 Truman, 
rarely of a mind to ask for Congress’ consent and, in Schlesinger’s opinion, “concerned 
not to squander the power of his office,” took the recommendation of Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson and committed United States troops to the defense of South Korea, armed 
with a list of eighty-seven precedents in which presidents had used troops without 
Congress’ approval.10 Truman labeled his commitment a “police action” in order to 
sidestep the Constitution and come to South Korea’s aid at the behest of the United 
Nations. It would become a declaration of war in all but name. 
 The immediate congressional backlash over Truman’s unilateral action was 
subdued. No president in history had ever asserted the constitutional authority to 
unilaterally commit so many troops to the site of a foreign war against a major enemy. 
Yet, at the time, the appeal to emergency was powerful. And while the attack on South 
Korea did not pose a direct threat to United States territory, it did demand a rapid 
decision with what Schlesinger labels “great potential import for American security.” 
Regardless of the fact that Truman refused to consult, or even ask, congressional leaders, 
Schlesinger argues that “Congress soon confirmed and, in a sense, ratified American 
intervention by voting military appropriations and extending selective service.”11 In fact, 
when Truman’s statement of America’s commitment to defend South Korea was read 
                                                 
9 Cited in Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002) p. 379.  
10 Schlesinger, pp. 133, 376; for Truman’s inclination to act independently of Congress, see Offner, p. 468. 
11 Schlesinger, p. 134. 
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aloud, both the House and the Senate cheered. By a vote of 315 to 4, the House quickly 
approved a one-year extension of the draft law. In the Senate, Republican William 
Knowland called for “overwhelming support” for Truman from Americans of all political 
persuasions. 
 Immediate support for Truman’s “police action” did not stop with the houses of 
Congress. The response of the American people, the press, and virtually everyone whose 
opinion mattered in Washington was immediate and unqualified approval. Editorials 
applauded Truman for his “bold course” and his “momentous and courageous act.” “This, 
indeed,” wrote two prominent journalists, “was one of the occasions when Truman 
seemed to sum up the good things in America.”12 It was a sentiment shared by many at 
the outset of what would come to be labeled the Korean War. Unfortunately for Truman’s 
administration, the sentiment was short-lived. 
 As Truman’s “police action,” his “bold course,” evolved into a protracted and 
bloody war, congressional opinion rapidly reversed itself. With the tides of war quickly 
turning against US forces in Korea, many senators began voicing second thoughts and 
profound doubts about the wisdom of their hasty acquiescence to a presidential war. A 
New York congressman spoke for many when he lamented in early January, 1951, “how 
devastating a precedent they [Congress] have set in remaining silent while the President 
took over the powers specifically reserved for Congress in the Constitution.”13 While this 
sentiment would come to be accepted years later, it was not shared by all. According to 
Arnold Offner, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally, 
a senator from Texas, had argued as early as June 26 that “police permission was not 
                                                 
12 Citations from David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) p. 781. 
13 Cited in Schlesinger, p. 135. 
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required to shoot a burglar in one’s house and that Congress would tie the president’s 
hands debating any resolution. Hence, he [President Truman] had to act as commander in 
chief.”14 Paul H. Douglas, the Democratic senator from Illinois, defended the 
constitutionality of Truman’s action, basing his argument on the need for swift action in 
emergencies. “With tanks, airplanes and the atomic bomb,” Douglas contended, “war can 
become instantaneous and disaster can occur while Congress is assembling and 
debating.” He further asserted, citing the UN resolutions, that the deployment of U.S. 
troops to repel the North Koreans “was not an act of war, but, instead, merely the 
exercise of police power under international sanction.”15 
 Nor was the Truman administration silent in its defense. Secretary of State 
Acheson founded his support of the administration’s actions on the unique and dangerous 
international situation created by the Cold War. “We are in a position in the world 
today,” Acheson claimed, “where the argument as to who has the power to do this, that, 
or the other thing, is not exactly what is called for from America in this very critical 
hour.” Truman himself told a January 1951 press conference that “under the President’s 
constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces” he had the power to 
commit troops anywhere he wanted. He further contended that this authority had been 
“repeatedly recognized by Congress and the courts,” and asserted that his administration 
was going to “continue to send troops wherever it is necessary to uphold” its duties as a 
member of the United Nations. When later questioned regarding the constitutionality of 
his actions he responded “I haven’t got it with me just now, but you will find decisions by 
at least three Chief Justices on that very subject.” Asked if the opinion of the court 
                                                 
14 Offner, p. 376. 
15 Cited in ibid., p. 133. 
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stipulated he consult with Congress, Truman responded, “No, it did not . . .  and I do not 
have to unless I want to.”16 
 In the end, the debate over the constitutionality of Truman’s commitment of U.S. 
troops to South Korea is superfluous. Regardless of their lofty words and recourse to 
constitutional statutes, Congress had allowed Truman to establish the precedent it was 
chartered to prevent. In the voice of a true cold warrior, Secretary Acheson observed 
years later that “your job as President . . .  is to decide. Mr. Truman decided.”17 His 
decision, however, had drastic repercussions for the course of the cold war and, more 
importantly, for the structure of America’s foreign policy. Truman, in Schlesinger’s 
opinion, “dramatically and dangerously enlarged the power of future Presidents to take 
the nation into major war.”18 By committing the nation to war without a congressional 
declaration and then successfully defending his prerogative to act independently, Truman 
enormously expanded presidential powers in the realm of foreign policy.  
Arnold Offner, ever critical of Truman’s administration, claims that “Truman 
ought to have sought a war declaration or its equivalent. . . . [N]either congressional and 
public support, nor concern that debate would dishearten troops, obviated need for 
Congress’ authority to deploy forces.” Additionally, Truman’s decision to authorize the 
deployment of ground troops was not only constitutionally illegal, but also irresponsible 
and a damaging escalation of the war. Truman “knew, or should have known,” writes 
Offner, “that he was committing the nation to more than limited police action” and his 
refusal to seek a congressional resolution opened the door not only for attacks on 
“Truman’s war” and his presidency, but for his successors “to make extravagant claims 
                                                 
16 Cited in Schlesinger, p.136-138. 
17 Cited in McCullough, p. 783. 
18 Schlesinger, p. 135. 
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of presidential power while leading the nation into conflicts that ultimately diminished 
the stature of the office that Truman revered.”19 Offner is correct in his assessment of the 
danger Truman’s actions portended in terms of the use Truman’s successors would make 
of the precedent he set. What he does not acknowledge, however, is that Truman did not 
set the precedent alone. Congress had been more than complicit in its own irrelevancy. 
Regardless of where blame is apportioned, however, America’s executive entrance into 
the Korean War set the stage for the next several decades and established the cold war 
incarnation of the Imperial President, one whose hands were free to fight the godless 
communists on whatever corner of the globe the president found them. 
 
Enshrining the Practice: Dwight Eisenhower, Formosa, and the Eisenhower 
Doctrine 
 
 In early 1954, Vietnamese forces led by General Vo Nguyen Giap surrounded the 
French garrison at Dien Bien Phu and dug in for a prolonged and decisive siege to throw 
the French colonialists out of Vietnam once and for all. French forces, initially confident, 
soon realized their position was untenable and began calling upon the United States for 
aid. The situation had all the makings of another Korean War, and, had Congress allowed 
then-President Dwight D. Eisenhower to aid the French, the Dien Bien Phu crisis could 
have embroiled America in its Vietnam War a decade early.  
Eisenhower was shrewd enough to know that, with America still reeling from the 
Korean War, it would be political suicide to commit troops to another war across the 
globe without congressional support. According to Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower was 
“anxious to support the French, but only if they promised complete independence to the 
                                                 
19 Offner, p. 377. 
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Vietnamese and only if Britain joined the United States in intervening.” Meanwhile, 
Congress, acting entirely out of character, made it plain that no endorsement for the 
commitment of U.S. troops would be forthcoming. In fact, congressional leaders, 
including Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate majority leader, were “aghast. 
They remembered all too well the difficulties of the Korean War.”20 The British, 
currently busy dismantling their own empire, declined the offer to help the French hold 
on to theirs and Eisenhower turned the French down.21 Dien Bien Phu fell to Ho Chi 
Minh’s communist forces on May 7, 1954.  
In stark contrast to the Korean situation in 1950, the political situation at home in 
1954 prohibited any action without congressional approval, and Congress was not willing 
to approve. The contrast between the two situations does not stop there. On the surface it 
would seem that Congress had learned an important lesson from its silence at the outset 
of the Korean War. Perhaps the Senate had woken to the dangers of letting a president 
run rampant with America’s foreign policy. More likely, as other events would soon 
prove, Americans were simply too tired of fighting the Korean War to contemplate 
another engagement on the opposite side of the world. Just as the specific postwar 
situation after World War Two dictated the extent of presidential power, so, too, did the 
end of the Korean War. Fearful of repeating the bloody, drawn out conflict of the Korean 
War, Congress, and Eisenhower, could not allow the U.S. to go it alone. Congress’ 
refusal to issue the same sweeping authority it had given Truman had little to do with 
scruples about the expansion of presidential power. Although important for America’s 
                                                 
20 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1991) p. 141. 
21 Douglas Kinnard, Eisenhower: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 
Inc., 2002) p. 72. 
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cold war history, Eisenhower’s acknowledgement of congressional war-making power 
and Congress’ refusal to allow the commitment of U.S. troops would soon become an 
exception to the president’s rule. 
  Eisenhower’s next challenge began with the opening of hostilities off the coast of 
the People’s Republic of China. In September of 1954, communist artillery batteries 
shelled the island of Quemoy, one of the last holdouts of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist 
government, the only Chinese government the U.S. recognized as legitimate. The 
Nationalists responded with air raids and the two sides settled down to a war of words 
that lasted throughout the fall. By New Year’s Day 1955, however, the situation had 
escalated and Red China began heavy bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu Islands.While 
the shelling had actually been going on since September 3, 1954, the increased intensity 
in early 1955 seemed to signal an imminent invasion.22 Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek was 
predicting war at any time while Chou En-lai, the Communist Chinese Foreign Minister, 
threatened that an invasion was at hand. Despite the 150-mile Formosa Strait, the lack of 
a Communist Chinese Navy, and the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the strait, the 
threat of a full-scale invasion by Communist forces was high.23 The impracticality of an 
invasion aside, Eisenhower needed to react to the threat if America was going to support 
its ally. 
 Eisenhower approached Congress on January 24 and asked for what historian R. 
Alton Lee aptly calls a “blank check.”24 In a special message to the Congress on United 
States policy for the defense of Formosa, Eisenhower stressed the need to present a 
united front to communist opposition. After asserting his own prerogative to act as 
                                                 
22 R. Alton Lee, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and Statesman (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981) p. 195. 
23 Kinnard, p. 74. 
24 Lee, p. 195. 
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commander in chief to “take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order 
to protect the rights and security of the United States,” Eisenhower asked for a “suitable 
Congressional Resolution” to “clearly and publicly establish the authority of the 
President” and “make clear the unified and serious intentions of our Government, our 
Congress and our people.”  In the interest of peace, Eisenhower continued, the US must 
“remove any doubt regarding our readiness to fight . . . to preserve the vital stake of the 
free world in a free Formosa.”25 Eisenhower was asking for uncontrolled and unfettered 
authorization to act as he saw fit. According to a statement made by Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, the authorization Eisenhower sought would even include the use of 
atomic weapons. The Democratic-controlled Congress promptly passed the Formosa 
Resolution by a vote of 403 to 3 in the House and 85 to 3 in the Senate. 
 The Formosa Resolution, which stated that “the President of the United States . . . 
hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems 
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores 
against armed attack,” was expansive in its wording.26 Although Eisenhower refrained 
from using the authority it gave him, its passage essentially destroyed the last vestige of 
congressional control over the president’s ability to commit troops for the defense of U.S. 
interests. This time, unlike Korea, there had been no U.N. resolution requesting U.S. aid. 
And this time, unlike Dien Bien Phu, Congress had said yes.  
  With the Formosa Resolution’s expansive power in his diplomatic arsenal, 
Eisenhower was able to bluff his way to a ceasefire in Formosa without having to commit 
U.S. troops. Almost as soon as the ink dried on the agreement, however, the Eisenhower 
                                                 
25 Cited in Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, eds., The Eisenhower Administration 1953-1961 
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1971) p. 750. 
26 Cited in ibid., p. 752. 
 21 
administration was faced with another crisis, this time in the Middle East. By the mid-
1950s the Soviets, emboldened by America’s preoccupation with events in Asia, 
increased their intervention in the Middle East, a region with a volatile and violent 
political history. The Soviets wasted no time in exploiting the situation. After an attack 
on Egypt by Israeli paratroopers in late February, 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser sought a new source of arms to counter Israel’s French-supplied munitions. 
Nasser first approached the United States but, discouraged by the U.S.’ equivocal 
response, he turned to Russia. The Soviet Union was more than willing to comply and, in 
late 1955, Nasser announced the agreement to trade Egyptian cotton for Czech arms. 
Eisenhower, according to Ambrose, had a “conniption fit” when he learned of the deal. 
 In an attempt to tie Egypt to the West, Dulles offered to help Nasser build the 
Aswan Dam, a monumental project designed to generate power on the lower Nile and a 
longtime dream of Egypt’s government. Dulles’s idea, however, was not as well received 
at home as it was in Egypt. Technical experts deemed the project feasible, but southern 
politicians wondered why the U.S. should spend money to help the Egyptians grow more 
cotton, and old-guard Republicans feared the cost of the dam would unbalance the 
budget.27 While Americans were debating, Nasser turned up the heat in the Middle East. 
In April of 1956 Nasser formed a military alliance with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen 
and refused to renege on the Czech arms deal. Soon thereafter, he withdrew recognition 
of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and gave it to the People’s Republic of China. The 
U.S. abandoned the Aswan Dam project and Nasser seized the Suez Canal in retaliation. 
The British and the French, each of whom owned significant shares of the canal and 
depended on it for their supply of Middle Eastern oil, were now involved. 
                                                 
27 Ambrose, p. 159. 
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 Fearful that Nasser would close the canal to their shipping, Britain and France, in 
conjunction with Israel, began planning to retake the canal. Israel struck first and had 
seized most of the Sinai Peninsula in a matter of hours. British and French forces, under 
the unconvincing guise of a disinterested third party, began a march towards the canal. 
None of the combatants had informed the United States of their plans and the Eisenhower 
administration did not appreciate being left out of the loop. According to Ambrose, “Ike 
was upset at their use of nineteenth-century colonial tactics; he was livid at their failure to 
inform him of their intentions.”28 
 Appearing on national television on October 31, Eisenhower stated “there can be 
no peace without law. And there can be no law—if we were to invoke one code of 
international conduct for those who oppose us—and another for our friends.”29 The U.S., 
therefore, introduced a resolution in the U.N. General Assembly calling for a truce, 
followed by an oil embargo against Britain and France. Even Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev joined the fray, warning the British and French on November 5 to withdraw 
or be destroyed by Soviet rockets. Mere hours from taking the canal, Great Britain and its 
allies accepted a cease fire and withdrew; in Lee’s words, “thus ended the most serious 
crisis since the Korean War.”30 
 Although the crisis over the Suez Canal had ended, the Middle East was still in 
turmoil and very much up for grabs. Eisenhower, terrified of the Soviets gaining control 
of the site of over sixty percent of the world’s known oil reserves, needed to take a stand. 
Less than two months after the conclusion of the Suez crisis, on New Year’s Day 1957, 
Eisenhower met with congressional leaders of both parties and warned them that “[t]he 
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existing power vacuum in the Middle East . . . must be filled by the United States before 
it is filled by Russia.”31 Eisenhower was again seeking expansive authority to combat 
communism. To that end, he sent a special message to the Congress on the Middle East 
on January 5, 1957, asking for a joint resolution granting him the authority to use United 
States armed forces to protect the Middle East from communist aggression. Furthermore, 
Eisenhower called for an allotment of two hundred million dollars to be set aside in both 
1957 and 1958 to be used at his discretion for the defense of the Middle East. It was an 
enormous request. 
 Congress spent over two months debating the merits of this expansive joint 
resolution. Senator J.William Fulbright’s (D.-Ark), chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, took an immediate and vocal stand against the resolution. In a 
speech on the Senate floor in late January, 1957 he claimed the resolution would 
effectively “strike down the Senate’s rights and duties in the conduct of foreign affairs, as 
defined by 168 years of constitutional practice.” Furthermore, Fulbright likened the 
resolution to an abandonment of Congress’ “constitutional system of checks and 
balances,” warning that “from now on, naked Executive power will rule the highest and 
most fateful interests of the Nation.” Eisenhower’s administration put up a spirited 
defense and, despite Fulbright’s correct constitutional interpretation, the resolution 
passed the house by a vote of 355 to 61, and the Senate 72 to 19. The resolution, which 
granted powers to the president “the mere asking of which,” according to Fulbright, 
“would have led to a national outcry under any other administration back to 
Washington’s” was signed into law on March 9, 1957. 
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 The passage of the Joint Congressional Resolution “To Promote Peace and 
Stability in the Middle East,” which would come to be known as the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, was not unprecedented. Truman had been granted much the same in Korea, and 
Congress had given Eisenhower similar treatment with the Formosa Resolution. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine was unique in that it was not retaliatory, as Korea and Formosa had 
been, but pre-emptive. Eisenhower had asked Congress for a blank check to be signed in 
perpetuity in case something might happen. With the current situation in the Middle East 
Eisenhower had asked Congress, in Fulbright’s words, to be the “counsel, the judge, and 
the jury of national interest” with the power to commit troops, expend up to 
$200,000,000, and the discretion to “decide autonomously when his autonomous powers 
shall expire.”32 And Congress had agreed. 
 
Destructive Repercussions: Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
 At the time of John F. Kennedy’s death there were already 16,000 American 
troops in Vietnam.33 Kennedy’s presidency had witnessed a steady increase in both the 
provision of aid to South Vietnamese forces and American military presence in the 
country. With Kennedy’s assassination, however, the situation fell into the lap of his vice 
president, Lyndon B. Johnson. Soon after being sworn in, Johnson plainly stated that he 
was “not going to lose Vietnam” and that he refused “to be the President who saw 
Southeast Asia go the way China went.”34 It should come as no surprise, therefore, that as 
the situation in South Vietnam quickly deteriorated Johnson raised the stakes in the first 
few months of 1964. The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly ordered a series of patrols, known 
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as the DeSoto patrols, off the coast of North Vietnam and China in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
The purpose of these patrols was to collect information on the civil and military activities 
of the communist forces.  
On the morning of Sunday, August 2, 1964 television and radio newscasters broke 
the nation’s calm with an important announcement: during the night a U.S. Navy 
destroyer had been attacked in the Tonkin Gulf, 28 nautical miles from the coast of North 
Vietnam. Shortly after 4 P.M. local time three torpedo boats launched an attack on the 
USS Maddox. The Maddox evaded the trio of torpedoes and, joined by the rockets and 
cannon of four Navy aircraft flying from the U.S. carrier Ticonderoga, retaliated with its 
5-inch guns. The enemy rapidly gave up the attack and two of the torpedo boats managed 
a slow retreat, while the third sat motionless in the water, critically wounded. Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk announced that evening that the torpedo boats belonged to North 
Vietnam. Early the next morning Johnson doubled the U.S. patrol in the Gulf and 
provided the two ships with air cover. Accordingly, the U.S. carrier Constellation left 
Hong Kong on August 4, en route to the coast of North Vietnam. Only 12 hours after the 
Constellation’s departure, however, the combustible situation in the Tonkin Gulf erupted 
in gunfire for a second time. Around 11 A.M., August 4, two U.S. destroyers in the gulf 
reported the exchange of torpedoes and gunfire. With the Ticonderoga and both 
destroyers in the strait with the Constellation on its way, no U.S. ships were damaged 
while a minimum of two North Vietnamese torpedo boats were allegedly sunk.35 
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According to historian Eugene Windchy, “Officials at the White House agreed that the 
North Vietnamese should not go unpunished for their second attack.”36 
 Late in the evening of August 5, 1964, President Johnson spoke to the nation on 
radio and television about his decision to obtain a congressional resolution to make “it 
clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in 
support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.”37 On August 7, Congress 
passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution with a vote of 416-0 in the House and 88-2 in the 
Senate.  The Resolution was signed into law by President Johnson on August 11 and 
resolved that the United States was “prepared, as the President determines, to take all 
necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state 
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its 
freedom.” The resolution stipulated that “the Congress approves and supports the 
determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to 
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further 
aggression.”38 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, like the 1955 Formosa Resolution and the 
1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, was a dramatic congressional abdication of its 
constitutionally granted war making power to the executive branch. Congress, according 
to Anthony Austin, had “issued another of their blank checks that weren’t really meant to 
be cashed,” only this time the president was prepared to cash it.39 
 What led Congress to repudiate its own authority in the matter of foreign policy? 
Fredrik Logevall outlines several important factors in Congress’ momentous decision, the 
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first being the climate of the cold war and the precedent it had set. He writes that it was 
“a time in the nation’s history when national interests seemed perpetually under threat, 
and Congress was accustomed to backing presidential initiatives without serious 
question.”40 If Presidents Truman and Eisenhower had taught the country anything, it was 
that a president willing to fight the cold war needed the freedom to fight it. Secondly, the 
sensational nature of the Tonkin Gulf incident lent itself to a feeling of national outrage—
a feeling the Johnson administration had no problem cultivating. Finally, and, in 
Logevall’s opinion, most importantly, there was the upcoming presidential election of 
1964. Logevall mentions the fact that the entire House and a third of the Senate were up 
for reelection and “did not want to be charged with helping to put the flag in danger. . . . 
With mere days until the Democratic convention, most in the majority party would have 
considered it unthinkable to deny Johnson his request.”41 
 While these factors are compelling and close to comprehensive, they fail to 
account for the near total lack of debate on the Senate floor about handing the president 
the means to wage nearly unlimited war on the other side of the world. Most remarkable 
for his lack of critical questions was Senator Fulbright. Still chair of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and floor manager of the debate over the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 
Fulbright was instrumental in its passage. In a private conversation with a fellow 
congressman, Fulbright expressed his opinion that the resolution was practically 
meaningless, referring to it as a “cheerleader resolution.”42 Indeed, according to Ezra Siff, 
it was Fulbright’s failure, after all his years “of having dealt with Lyndon Johnson, to 
realize the reality of what was occurring.”  
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 Fulbright’s failure was more than one of passive acquiescence. When Senator 
Wayne Morse of Oregon attacked the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Fulbright actively 
opposed his arguments. Morse, according to Siff, “beseeched” Fulbright “to hold 
legitimate hearings, since there was no impending emergency. We had not been attacked 
on a massive scale such as followed Pearl Harbor. He warned Fulbright that the language 
was too broad.” Instead, Fulbright claimed a state of emergency and insisted the 
legislative process be accelerated. So, instead of comprehensive hearings which would 
have put all aspects of the Vietnam War up for debate and in front of the public, the old 
“LBJ style utilized in pushing through domestic legislation was again used—accelerated 
hearings, minimum number of witnesses, limited debate, unanimous consent 
agreements.”43 Additionally, when questioned by a Democratic senator on “whether there 
is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing 
of large American armies in Vietnam or in China” Fulbright responded, “There is nothing 
in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. . . . However, the language of the 
resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief 
feels is necessary. It does not restrain the Executive from doing it.”44 Fulbright 
understood that the resolution allowed for a full-scale declaration of war at the 
president’s discretion, yet he argued for its passage anyway. 
 Although Morse battled valiantly for several days, his influence was minimal. He 
was considered dour, humorless, and sanctimonious. His speeches were riddled with 
trivia and, therefore, did not move many senators to his position. In fact, his colleagues 
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endured, rather than listened; when he spoke, the chamber was often empty.45 The 
Senate, rather than objectively and exhaustively arguing the merits of this resolution, 
chose instead to underwrite its own insignificance. It seemed that, in Siff’s words, 
“members of the United States Senate, after a history of close to 200 years, still did not 
realize the independence of the legislative branch and the duty of its members to exercise 
that independence if they think executive action to be wrong.”46 Thus was precipitated 
“not only the human tragedy of the eight-year Vietnam War, but a major constitutional 
crisis as the legislative branch failed to temper the unilateral use of executive power in 
conducting a war without effective Congressional oversight and contrary to Congress’ 
constitutional duty.”47 
 By 1968, American casualties in Vietnam had surpassed those of the Korean War, 
making Vietnam the third bloodiest foreign war in American history.48 The United States, 
however, never officially declared war. Furthermore, in a news conference held August 
18, 1967, President Johnson claimed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was unnecessary for 
“what we did and what we are doing [in Vietnam].” 49 Officials in his administration, on 
the other hand, often cited the resolution as the legal justification for their actions and, 
despite what he said, Johnson found the resolution extraordinarily useful. For a while, he 
even carried it in his breast pocket, ready to produce at a moment’s notice.50 
 
Top of the Hill: The Future of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
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 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was integral to America’s escalation of the Vietnam 
War between the years of 1964 and 1968; the resolution represented the sole legal 
justification for America’s military presence in Vietnam by the time Richard Nixon was 
sworn into the Oval Office. The passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution marked the high 
point of the long and steady rise of presidential power throughout the cold war. Having 
begun with Monroe and been expanded under Truman and Eisenhower, the precedent for 
Congress’ renunciation of its obligation to supervise foreign policy at the behest of the 
president had been well established when Johnson inherited the presidency from his 
assassinated predecessor. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution would come to embody all that the 
Formosa Resolution never did. Whereas the Formosa Resolution, in the tradition of 
Monroe’s invasion of Spanish Florida, caused threats of major war and heated exchanges, 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, like Truman’s “police action,” caused over 50,000 American 
deaths and devastated each man’s presidency.51 
 If the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution marked the height of the executive 
branch’s ascendancy over its legislative counterpart, what marked the beginning of the 
end for this imbalance of power? When did Congress finally wake up to its shortcomings 
and take back the responsibilities it had willingly bestowed on the executive ever since 
Truman told it to in the 1950s? For most scholars and students, Congress’ passage of the 
War Powers Bill of 1973 marked Congress’ first bold and courageous step towards 
reasserting the power it had lost.52 The reality, however, is that Congress made that 
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statement three years earlier, in 1970, when it attempted to rectify its biggest mistake by 
repealing the resolution it had rubber stamped. The repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
was Congress’ first successful reassertion of the power it had once wielded and, as such, 




A Strange Alliance 
 
 
A Confusing Calendar 
“Senate Voids Resolution on Tonkin, 81-10” read the headline on the front page 
of the Washington Post as the nation awoke on Thursday, June 25, 1970.1 Nearly six 
years after passing the resolution that was integral to America’s rapid escalation of the 
Vietnam War, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to erase it from the books. As with any 
historical event, however, the real story is always more complicated than the headline and 
the labyrinthine road to repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was no exception. 
Originally placed on the Senate calendar by Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the repeal actually passed as an amendment to the 
Foreign Military Sales Act sponsored by Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) and President 
Richard Nixon’s supporters in what Time magazine termed a “legislative coup.”2 The 
overwhelming passage of the Dole Amendment by both Democratic doves and 
Republican hawks, however, undermined Dole’s ulterior motives for introducing his 
amendment and allowed it to serve as a vehicle for a significant and long overdue debate 
on the constitutional division of war-making powers and the Senate’s forgotten 
responsibility to oversee the nation’s foreign policy in the nuclear age. 
 By late 1969, the American people had seen almost six years of war in Vietnam, 
two presidents, over 500,000 American boys deployed overseas, and very little proof that 
a military victory was in sight. Despite Nixon’s claims of de-escalation and 
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“Vietnamization,” only 60,000 troops had come home.3 The war was not winding down 
as quickly as most Americans wanted and domestic anti-war fervor was out of control. In 
the academic year of 1969-70 alone there were 1,800 demonstrations against the war, 
7,500 arrests, 462 injuries (two-thirds of them suffered by police officers), 247 cases of 
arson, and 8 deaths.4 Yet, in the Senate, a bipartisan movement spearheaded by the 
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT) had been underway for some time to 
postpone criticism of Nixon’s administration in order to give him the political leeway 
needed to fulfill his promise of withdrawal.  
While college campuses and city streets erupted in riots and the trickle of troop 
withdrawals failed to meet Nixon’s promises of de-escalation, Mansfield, a distinguished 
and highly respected senator, in stark contrast to domestic opinion, urged congressional 
caution and implored the senators to trust in Nixon as late as the fall of 1969.5 On 
October 20, 1969 he told the Senate “I want to say, as a Democrat, that it would be my 
intention to support the President in every effort he would make toward a responsible and 
a peaceful departure from the quagmire in which we are caught, and I assure him that . . . 
there will be no politics involved, because this is not a Republican responsibility, except 
that the President happens to be a Republican.”6 Despite the national outcry against the 
war and little evidence that Nixon’s promises of “Vietnamization” were anything but 
empty rhetoric, the Senate, with Mansfield at the helm, continued to evince the 
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congressional acquiescence to presidential policy that had almost become habitual by this 
point. Unbeknownst to many in the Senate, however, that habit was about to be broken. 
Throughout the fall and into the early spring Nixon continued to espouse a policy 
of de-escalation. Nixon’s personal notes for a November 3 address—what has come to be 
known as the “Silent Majority” speech—reveal the difference between Nixon’s public 
rhetoric and personal feelings on the subject. While publicly hinting at a desire to reach a 
military accommodation in Southeast Asia, Nixon privately wrote that “[t]hey can’t 
defeat us militarily in Vietnam. They can’t break South Vietnam. . . . They cannot break 
us.”7 In line with those sentiments, on April 30, 1970, Nixon ordered an invasion, or 
“incursion,” into Cambodia in a bid to destroy Vietcong lines of supply and support. The 
nation erupted in protest over this apparent expansion of the war and the Senate was 
forced to drastically reevaluate its position.8 According to Mansfield biographer Don 
Oberdorfer, the Cambodian invasion “dashed the remaining hopes of Mansfield and 
many others that the President was bent on progressively limiting and swiftly terminating 
the war.” Prior to April 30, Mansfield had opposed congressional efforts to dictate war 
policy to the president, “accepting the view that executive branch authority was supreme 
in the case of ongoing military actions.” Cambodia, however, was the last straw and 
“[o]vernight, Mansfield went from being a mere critic of the war to being one of the most 
powerful advocates of congressional coercion to bring it to an end.”9 The Senate went 
with him. 
After Nixon’s Cambodian invasion and Mansfield’s change of heart, the Foreign 
Military Sales Bill (FMSB), a piece of pending legislation aimed at providing guidelines 
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for the sale of U.S. arms to foreign nations, took on new meaning in May of 1970. 
Without Mansfield to stymie criticism of Nixon’s administration, the Senate treated the 
Foreign Military Sales Bill as a long-awaited opportunity to debate not only America’s 
continued presence in Vietnam but, more importantly, what role the legislature should 
and would play in shaping that presence. To that end, senators like John Sherman Cooper 
(R-KY), Frank Church (D-ID), George McGovern (D-SD), and Mark Hatfield (R-OR) 
began presenting amendments to the FMSB with the intention of setting legislative limits 
on the nearly unilateral power of the presidency.  
Senators Church and Cooper fired the opening salvo, presenting the Cooper-
Church Amendment to the FMSB. The amendment, sponsored by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, called for the prohibition of U.S. military action in Cambodia after 
June 30, with the threat of funding cuts to arm the deadline with some teeth. Next, in 
rapid succession, came the Hatfield-McGovern Amendment, labeled the “amendment to 
end the war” which, if passed, would have required the cessation of all U.S. combat 
activity in Vietnam no later than July 1, 1971. Both amendments represented the first real 
congressional attack on the foreign policy of a Cold War president and were marked 
deviations from the cold war timidity of recent congressional history. Additionally, each 
amendment served as a clarion call to Nixon’s opponents to begin the process of 
legislating a peace in an attempt to both bring American troops home and chisel away at 
the nearly impenetrable fortress of executive authority. 
In this environment of nearly relentless assault against Nixon’s administration, 
foreign policy, and prosecution of the war Nixon’s supporters scrabbled for any way to 
turn the tides. As such, Senator Dole, on June 22, 1970, thrust the repeal of the Tonkin 
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Gulf Resolution before the Senate by offering it as an amendment to the Foreign Military 
Sales Bill. In an attempt to rob Nixon’s opponents of their momentum, Dole, according to  
Time magazine, “stole the issue out from under the doves by offering it himself.”10 The 
political ploy particularly bothered Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), the chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations committee, well known war-critic, and floor manager for 
the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964. The Wall Street Journal reported that 
Fulbright had made the repeal “something of a pet project,” and the Washington Post 
remarked that he was “visibly angered” when Dole swooped in and stole it from him.11 
Fulbright was not alone; in fact, much of the debate over the Dole Amendment centered 
not on the merits of repeal but the manner in which the subject had been broached. 
Regardless of the Dole Amendment’s roots in partisan politics, the debate surrounding its 
passage was significant and, in the words of the New York Times, “more dense than the 
population of angels on the proverbial head of a pin.” The amendment’s overwhelming 
passage (81-10) validated many senators’ outrage over presidential war and continued 
congressional timidity, highlighted the nation’s frustration over the prolonged conflict, 
and sent the message that “[t]he rubric of war-by-resolution [was] passing out of 
fashion.”12 
 
“All in Favor?. . ."  
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 The debate over the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, for almost the first time 
since President Truman had received his blank check to wage war in Korea, functioned as 
a forum for the discussion of what the Senate’s constitutional responsibilities were in the 
realm of foreign policy and the tactics of war. Historian Eugene P. Dvorin has written 
that “[a]s one follows the debate the impression increases that the Senators are putting the 
Senate itself on trial--as an institution.”13 Although it seems simple to organize an 
analysis of the debate by looking at the arguments for and against the repeal individually, 
the nature of Dole’s political gambit clouded the final vote and muddled the underlying 
issues many senators were raising. In fact, as the Wall Street Journal noted, the “lineup 
by no means reflected the Senate’s true division of feeling on the merits of the Vietnam 
War, or on the Nixon Administration’s rate of disengagement from it. Some of the 
Senate’s most conservative hawks . . . voted for repeal.”14 With many senators casting 
votes that contradicted long-held and deeply felt positions, a voter lineup approach to 
digesting the debate is nearly useless. Instead, an issue-based analysis provides the 
opportunity to highlight the central issues and understand the meaning behind the repeal 
of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 
After twenty years of acquiescing to presidential demands and six years spent 
fighting a hopeless and technically undeclared war, the issue at the fore of any 
congressman’s mind was the re-establishment of the congressional sphere of influence in 
foreign affairs that had all but disappeared by 1970. Immediately after Senator Dole 
finished his introductory remarks, therefore, Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY) opened the 
debate with that very subject, asking “[w]hat is the definition of the power of the 
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President and what is the definition of the power of Congress in respect of [sic] the power 
of making war?”15 In defense of the repeal, Javits succinctly stated that “[t]he President 
stands where he stands under the Constitution. We stand where we stand under the 
Constitution. . . . This [the repeal] could do more to restore balance to this debate than 
any other single thing we can contribute in Congress.”16 
Having endured decades of silence on the issue of Congress’s place in modern 
foreign policy, senators clamored to agree with Javits and make their own cases. One 
eloquent spokesman of congressional authority was Senator Frank Moss (D-UT). Citing 
the specific constitutional articles having to do with the division of war making powers, 
Moss declared that “[i]n repealing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, we will be one step closer 
to returning to the intentions of the framers of the Constitution,” each of whom “had had 
the bitter experience of having to pay for wars that English kings started. The framers 
were careful, therefore, to divide the war making powers between the President and 
Congress, and to provide the Congress, through the power of the purse, with an additional 
check on the President.”17 Senator Fulbright, although he ultimately voted against the 
Dole Amendment, pointed out that “resolutions such as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution 
amount to congressional acquiescence in the exercise by the Executive of a power which 
the Constitution vested in Congress and which the Congress has no authority to give 
away.”18 Fulbright then asked the floor if “the Senate, as part of the Congress, still has, 
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under the Constitution, the responsibility for the declaration of war, the initiation of 
war?” The senator answered his own question, affirming, “I think it does.”19  
This challenging, questioning, confident congressional language surrounding the 
separation of war making powers was remarkable in comparison to the submissive 
congressional attitude of the previous two decades. Although there had been antiwar 
rhetoric on the Senate floor in each of the cold war’s conflicts, the perceived need for 
strong and unfettered executive suppressed any comprehensive constitutional arguments 
for the reassertion of congressional war making powers. Now, with the president 
unilaterally expanding the war into neighboring countries and the domestic scene in 
turmoil, the nation experienced an intense increase in the legislature’s confidence. 
Senator Moss summed up the Senate’s changing mind-set when he pithily stated, “No 
more Vietnams!”20 
Aside from clearing up the issue surrounding the declaration of war, the 
Constitution had left the question of the exact means for waging war largely up in the air. 
The Constitution clearly labeled the president commander in chief of all military forces, 
but where did that authority end? What means were at Congress’s disposal to vent their 
frustration at the way the war had been handled? The Constitution gave Congress control 
over monetary appropriations—the power of the purse—yet it had seldom been used as a 
means of ending a conflict, considering the fact that it was often the troops, not the 
president, who suffered the consequences. During the debate over the repeal of the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Senators Mike Mansfield, Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), and 
Norris Cotton (R-NH) all brought up the hitherto unacceptable question of the Senate’s 
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role in limiting a president’s military authority as commander in chief and even 
legislating a president out of war (as the Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern 
Amendments attempted to do). Cotton, in a lengthy speech in favor of repeal, expressed 
his opinion that repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would be a “logical first step” in the 
face of Nixon’s escalation “before we proceeded to the . . . more drastic step or expedient 
of exercising our power of the purse and attempting to shut off . . . the pay, the support, 
the arming, and the protection of American troops serving in Southeast Asia.”21 After 
citing Nixon’s Cambodian invasion, Cotton likened repeal of the resolution to the 
Senate’s constitutionally granted power to limit war through appropriations, a new 
interpretation of Congress’ ability to supervise the president’s foreign policy and a 
theoretical expansion of the power the Constitution had specifically stipulated. 
Still other senators viewed the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as a 
referendum on the commander in chief’s tactics in waging the war. On June 22, 1970 
Senator Jack Miller (R-IA) lent his weight to the repeal movement as a form of protest. 
He chose to vote for repeal because it “would be the first chance I have had legislatively 
to indicate my protest over the way the war was conducted for nearly 5 years following 
adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution by Congress.”22 In fact, it was one of the first 
chances any congressman had had to legislatively voice protest about a cold war 
president’s foreign policy in over a decade. Miller’s language, though he backpedaled 
slightly in the next paragraph of his speech, continued the dramatic new trend of 
congressional confidence and legislative boldness that was unheard of as little as six 
years ago. 
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“All opposed?. . .” 
 The Dole Amendment came before the Senate at a time when Congress had 
finally reawakened to its constitutional obligations to participate in foreign policy. Some 
senators were groping for any means with which they could force Nixon out of Vietnam. 
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, therefore, was ripe for repeal and the Dole Amendment 
received an overwhelming majority of supporters. The rhetoric surrounding the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution’s repeal was striking in its departure from previously held notions of 
cold war government and the exercise of foreign policy, a departure that not all senators 
were pleased to see. Several senators argued eloquently against the repeal of the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution for reasons as varied as their opponents’. Although the opposition only 
carried a total of ten votes, their arguments ranged from persuasive to technical and were 
based upon reasons ranging from a fear of foreign perceptions to the hypocrisy of 
ignoring past precedents. 
 One of the most vocal critics of the Dole Amendment, it turned out, was also one 
the most vocal antiwar senators and advocates of repeal. J. William Fulbright, despite his 
integral role in the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964, has been almost 
canonized for his antiwar record during the 1960s and early 70s. Famed for breaking with 
his old friend Lyndon Johnson over the Vietnam War and his attempts to rectify the 
mistake he made in ’64 by ushering the Mathias Resolution through the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Fulbright was a poster-child for the Democratic antiwar movement 
of the Vietnam era.23 A close scrutiny of his actions during the debate on the Dole 
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Amendment, however, reveals a very different picture. Fulbright alternatively waffled 
between persuasive and well-expressed constitutional arguments supporting repeal of the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution and petty, spiteful comments protesting Senator Dole’s disregard 
for procedure.  
 The majority of Fulbright’s objection to Dole’s amendment surrounded the form 
in which Dole was attempting to repeal the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Before Dole 
introduced his amendment to the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee had placed the Mathias Resolution, a resolution to repeal Tonkin 
Gulf, on the Senate’s calendar and was only awaiting the end of debate on the Cooper-
Church Amendment and the Foreign Military Sales Act. Aside from simply supplanting 
Senator Mathias and snubbing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Dole 
Amendment also differed in form from what the Mathias Resolution sought to do. The 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, when it was passed, specifically stipulated two ways it might be 
repealed: if the president decided there was no longer a need for action in Southeast Asia, 
or the Senate passed a “concurrent resolution” calling for its repeal. The Mathias 
Resolution would have secured this concurrent resolution since it had received the 
blessing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after extensive hearings and debate. 
Dole’s amendment, on the other hand, as an attachment to a separate piece of legislation, 
did not qualify as a concurrent resolution and several senators felt it was precipitous to 
repeal what had become a major tenet of U.S. foreign policy in such an offhand manner.  
Fulbright had been appointed chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1959 and had, in the words of historian Lewis L. Gould, spent the next 
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fifteen years “transforming the committee into a kind of miniature State Department in 
which he could develop his ideas on foreign policy.”24 It was important to him, therefore, 
that his committee receive credit for repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. After Dole’s 
unexpected presentation of his amendment, Fulbright peevishly complained, “You might 
as well abolish the Foreign Relations Committee.”25 While discussing his procedural 
objections to Dole’s amendment Fulbright commented that “I can only conclude that the 
Senator [Dole] has not listened very carefully and has not observed what the proper 
procedures are. . . . I do not blame the Senator, in view of his brief attendance here, for 
not having learned all the proper procedures.”26 Two days later, Fulbright remarked that 
“I suppose I could go to the calendar and pick up a bill that the Senator from Kansas 
[Dole] has worked on and gotten through the committee, and I could . . . offer it as an 
amendment and get it passed, and then it would be the Fulbright bill, and I would get 
credit down home for someone else’s bill.”27 Although Fulbright was committed to the 
repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, he wanted it repealed his way, through the Mathias 
Resolution which had passed his Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not as an 
amendment to a minor bill. “It implies a certain disrespect for the Foreign Relations 
Committee,” claimed Fulbright; he was not alone in those sentiments, even if the other 
senators expressed them with a bit more class.28  
Senator Spessard Holland (D-FL) echoed Fulbright’s sentiments when he voiced 
his opinion that “the matter is of such grave importance that under no consideration 
should we . . . consider . . . placing this in the bill providing for the sale of arms, a bill 
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which has already grown far beyond the scope which I think it was intended to serve.”29 
Senator John C. Stennis (D-MS), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
predictably lent his voice to Fulbright’s argument in an attempt to uphold the sanctity of 
the committee system, asserting that “[t]his matter has no place as an amendment to this 
bill.”30 He concluded two days later by stating, “I believe it borders on the ridiculous . . . 
to come in here at the last minute and attempt to add this amendment to the bill.”31 
Finally, calling attention to the fact that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution specifically 
stipulated that it might be repealed by concurrent resolution, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) 
reacted negatively to the proceedings, noting that “the proposal, instead of repealing it by 
concurrent resolution, would repeal it by an amendment to an act of Congress having 
nothing to do with the subject. The Senate is getting itself in a rather perplexing state.”32 
In fact, issues of procedure took up far more space than substance in the debate. 
One of the first substantive arguments against repeal was brought up by Stennis, who 
contended that, whatever it was intended to mean, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution “was made 
a major part of the foreign policy of our Nation by President Johnson. . . . We, to that 
extent, by implication made it part of our foreign policy. That is known in Hanoi, Peking, 
and Moscow, and everywhere else.”33 Stennis, casting his sight beyond America’s 
national problems and looking at the world through the cold war lens, was worried about 
how Congress’s actions would be perceived. “I think,” he said, “that when Hanoi, Peking, 
and Moscow learn of the repeal of this resolution, particularly in such a precipitous way . 
. . the people in those areas will be impressed with the fact that this action is a further 
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curtailment of the powers and discretion of the President.”34 In short, Stennis, as a true 
cold warrior, was afraid of looking weak or hesitant in the face of the communist 
monolith. Ernest Hollings (D-SC) reiterated Stennis’s sentiments, prophesying that repeal 
would cause “Mardi Gras in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.”35  
Senator James Allen (D-AL) took up a defensive post alongside Stennis. Allen 
viewed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as the basis for all of America’s actions in Vietnam 
since the Kennedy administration and, as such, a statement of America’s determination to 
stick to the fight against communism. His main objection was that repeal would 
“withdraw from the President the real basic and fundamental vehicle by which American 
action was taken in South Vietnam.”36 Allen held special stock in the preambles and 
recitals of purpose that were attached to the beginning of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and 
which he was unwilling to give up for fear of repudiating all of America’s actions in 
Southeast Asia. Additionally, repeal of the resolution would only prove that “we are 
lacking the resolve and determination to carry on this war to an honorable end.”37 In a 
war of ideologies like the cold war, the perception of strength and resolve is often more 
valuable than an army, and Allen was not willing to retire that force. 
Senator Gale McGee (D-WY) took a different tack in his opposition to repeal, 
bringing up concerns for the future and the futility of attempting to rewrite the past. 
McGee called the repeal a “slap at the President” and warned that its fallout “almost 
certainly will have the effect of startling or even panicking the governments of a number 
of small, independent countries in Eastern Asia.” McGee stated, “the Senate . . . is at this 
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time trying to play a trick on the past by appearing to undo something that some of the 
Members at least wish they had not done.” McGee implored the Senate to look to the 
future instead of attempting to “repeal the past.” Pointing out that “our country has a 
curious penchant for refighting the last war,” McGee hoped that the Senate could concern 
itself “with what our role ought to be in the next crisis, for surely there will be another 
and yet another: rather than spinning our legislative wheels over who did what to whom 
in the last crisis.”38 McGee’s arguments were startlingly somber and levelheaded and 
they stood out from the debate for their political neutrality at a time when partisan power 
plays and petty infighting seemed to be running rampant throughout congress. 
Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), on the other hand, argued to uphold the very 
precedent of congressional submission to executive authority that many of his colleagues 
vehemently opposed. Nelson spoke on the congressional precedent of authorizing and 
appropriating the money “that has gone into one of the most massive military 
construction programs in Southeast Asia.” He further stated that there were no less than 
130 precedents (the same 130 precedents Truman had cited before committing the U.S. to 
the Korean War) for presidents sending troops to war without congressional approval or 
even consultation. Nelson drew the Senate’s attention to the inherent hypocrisy in the fact 
that Congress had willingly established a “hands-off” precedent for presidents who 
wanted to escalate conflicts or deploy troops, but now that Nixon was “trying to extricate 
us from Southeast Asia, . . . trying to reduce the level of our involvement, . . . we decide 
that now is the time to stay the President’s hand.”39 Nelson’s speech, though it failed to 
carry the day, highlighted the other side of the important constitutional question over the 
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division of powers between Congress and the executive. Nelson was fundamentally 
asking what store the Congress was really placing on the Constitution and the vaunted 
precedents Congress had established and what store it was placing on politics. 
Each senator’s arguments in opposition to the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution touched upon different aspects of American governance. The role of the 
committee system in congressional proceedings, cold war sensitivity to international 
perception, America’s resolve to stay the course, the uselessness of attempting to repeal 
history, or the emphasis placed on precedent were each given their spot in the limelight 
and represented legitimate concerns that the Senate had too long been reluctant to raise. 
 
A Mixed Bag: the Meaning of Repeal and an Uncertain Future 
The debate surrounding Dole’s amendment, though fraught with petty infighting 
and political maneuvering, was extremely significant. While the ripples caused by the 
repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution fell far short of affecting U.S. troops stationed in 
Vietnam, the rhetoric on the Senate floor regarding the passage of the Dole Amendment 
was far from hollow. Hailed as both a show of support for Nixon’s policy of de-
escalation through Vietnamization and a major step towards reasserting congressional 
war powers and ending the Vietnam War, the debate surrounding repeal of the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution and the passage of the Dole Amendment illustrated the extraordinary 
divisions within the Senate. Regardless of its introduction as a political gamble by 
Nixon’s supporters, the rhetoric leading up to the passage of the Dole Amendment 
illustrated the Senate’s fury over the prolonged, ineffective, and bloody war that was not 
only still raging in Vietnam, but had recently spread into Laos and Cambodia, and the 
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nation’s desire to see a cold war president finally come to heel when called by his 




“Congress Has Lost Its Nerve” 
 
 
Still Waters: The Deceptive Repercussions of the Dole Amendment  
Although Congress had handed President Eisenhower a blank check to wage war 
for defense of Formosa in 1955, Eisenhower never took the country to war. 
Consequently, it was difficult to appreciate at the time just how serious a precedent 
Congress had set, a precedent that almost assured the later passage of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution. Congress fashioned a similar “time bomb” when it passed the Dole 
Amendment and repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The immediate repercussions of 
the passage of the Dole Amendment were negligible. President Nixon ignored the repeal,1 
the American boys serving in Vietnam were not immediately brought home, and, after 
receiving cursory coverage in the newspapers, the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
fell out of the public eye. Given this muted response, an observer in 1970 could be 
forgiven for concluding that nothing had changed, that Dole’s attempt to rob the repeal of 
any impact had succeeded. Yet, as with the Formosa Resolution, Congress had 
established a precedent that would have important long-term effects. 
 With the passage of the Dole Amendment, the Senate had reclaimed its 
constitutional right to superintend American foreign policy, a right that it had sacrificed 
to President Truman in 1950. Soon after the passage of the Dole Amendment, Congress 
took decisive action against participants in the Watergate scandal, cut funds for President 
Nixon’s war in Vietnam, and passed the War Powers Act of 1973 in an attempt to confine 
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future executives to the strict letter of the Constitution that so many had flouted. The 
most vivid illustration of Congress’ newfound backbone came in late 1975 with the 
Senate’s 54-22 passage of the Tunney Amendment to suspend all U.S. covert action in 
Angola.  
 
The Backdrop: America’s Covert Angolan Intervention 
 Angola, a country on the west coast of the southern tip of Africa, is about the size 
of Texas and has a population of around six million people. It had been a Portuguese 
colony for over four hundred and fifty years by the time Nixon took up residence in the 
White House. Portugal had difficulty controlling Angola, however; a guerrilla war for 
independence centered on three nationalist parties simmered throughout the 1960s. 
America, more interested in maintaining western European alliances than fighting for 
Angola’s independence, affected an attitude of studied indifference towards both sides of 
the burgeoning conflict during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years. Nixon’s 
White House took a different approach. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, ever mindful 
of the threat posed by the spread of communism, wanted both a strong NATO and access 
to Portugal’s strategic military base in the Azores. Nixon, to accomplish both tasks 
simultaneously, signed an executive agreement to loan Portugal $436 million in 1971, 
quickly followed by the sale of military transports and more money in 1972.2 But 
Portugal could not translate American aid into battlefield victory, and, following an April 
1974 military coup in Lisbon, Portuguese military leaders decided to relinquish their 
colonies. 
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 In January of 1975, Portugal established a transitional government in the capital 
city of Luanda to prepare for an October election and a scheduled November 11 
Independence Day. The task of running the transitional government was, in theory, to be 
shared equally by the three nationalist groups that had warred for Angolan independence 
throughout the 1960s and early 70s: the Popular Movement for Liberation (MPLA), 
Angola’s National Liberation Front (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA). But ethnic and tribal antagonism prevented the three 
groups working together and the government existed in a state of constant turmoil. 
Foreign powers wasted little time in exploiting this chaos, pouring troops and weapons 
into the country and changing the inter-tribal civil struggle into an international conflict 
for ideological dominance.  
 According to John Stockwell, former chief of the CIA’s Angolan Task Force, 
Kissinger was “frustrated by our humiliation in Vietnam” and was “seeking opportunities 
to challenge the Soviets.”3 Kissinger therefore authorized $300,000 for the CIA to 
covertly assist the FNLA in early 1975. “The final choice between the two anti-Soviet 
groups had been arbitrary,” historian Derek Leebaert contends. “Washington initially 
joined with Beijing to back the FNLA, then drifted over to . . . UNITA once that faction 
was discovered to be stronger than initially assumed.”4 Although the strengths of each 
party were unclear to policymakers in Washington, the need for greater hands-on U.S. 
involvement to stave off an easy Soviet victory was apparent and Ford and Kissinger 
stepped up American aid to the anti-Soviet parties. By July 1975 the Air Force began 
shipping obsolete National Guard and Army Reserve weapons to Kinsasha, capital city of 
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neighboring Zaire, and the floodgates of the U.S. treasury had been thrown open. Money 
began flying out of the CIA’s Contingency Reserve Fund to disappear into the Angolan 
jungles.5 The Soviets, officially in response to American intervention, decided to 
seriously commit to aiding the MPLA and, following the influx of over fifty thousand 
Cuban troops transported to Angola by Fidel Castro in Soviet planes, the MPLA forces 
seized power in November 1975.6 Estimates for Soviet spending ran as high as $225 
million. “In a penny-ante war,” Stockwell remarks, “the Soviets had opened their wallets 
and put real money on the table.”7 
 Ford recalls in his memoirs that, by the middle of December, “it had become clear 
that our aid was insufficient. We would have to supply more. We had no intention of 
sending any U.S. military personnel to Angola, but about $25 million worth of arms 
might give the pro-West forces there a chance.”8 With the Agency’s Contingency 
Reserve Fund rapidly dwindling, however, Ford would need a specific congressional 
appropriation to send even one more dollar to the Angolan countryside. Congress was not 
interested. 
 
Pulling the Plug: Congressional Defiance 
 Ford had campaigned hard for his party during the midterm congressional 
elections of 1974, giving eighty-five speeches in twenty-eight states to rally support for 
the GOP. After the Watergate scandal, however, and against a backdrop of galloping 
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inflation and massive unemployment, Ford’s campaign had little chance of success. The 
American public was tired of Republican promises and, in historian Yanek Mieczowski’s 
words, “the Democratic landslide was the most resounding since the depression days of 
1932, when economic stresses propelled Democrats to huge victories and sank the 
Republican Party to its knees.” The Ninety-fourth Congress, as a result, would be 
“emphatically Democratic” and Ford’s struggles against this Congress “would be a 
defining theme of his presidency, a source of great political hardship to him, and an 
obstacle to his policies.”9 The executive-legislature clash was especially bitter when Ford 
attempted to win congressional support for his policy in Angola. 
 Despite a cleverly orchestrated CIA campaign to keep members of Congress in 
the dark about U.S. operations in Angola, the subject came up on the Senate floor in early 
December 1975.10 Tired of being stonewalled by CIA officials and frustrated by the 
multiple veils of secrecy layered over Angolan operations, Senator Dick Clark (D-IA), 
chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, recommended that the committee indirectly control the CIA by cutting off 
the CIA’s budget for operations in Angola. The Foreign Relations Committee agreed and 
introduced the Tunney Amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal 
Year 1976 to the Senate. Named after its author, Senator John Tunney (D-CA), the 
amendment prohibited the use of all future Defense Department funds in Angola for 
anything but the gathering of intelligence. The Amendment’s message was clear: get out 
of Angola. 
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 The Senate debate over the Tunney Amendment, lasting only three days, was 
short but spirited, with senators of both parties defending and attacking Tunney’s agenda. 
The forces arrayed against the Tunney Amendment were formidable, including Senate 
Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-PA), Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations John McClellan (D-AR), Secretary of State Kissinger, and President 
Ford, each of whom lobbied hard for the amendment’s defeat. Scott attacked the Tunney 
Amendment as an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to unilaterally determine policy. 
“I think we are setting a very dangerous precedent,” Scott argued on December 19, 1975, 
the day of the Senate vote. “[I]f we are going to unilaterally alter the U.S. foreign policy,” 
he warned, “the Senate had better be prepared to accept full responsibility.”11 McClellan, 
striking the pose of the cold warrior, worried how another withdrawal in the face of 
Soviet aggression would affect America’s international prestige. What will the world 
think, McClellan sarcastically asked the Senate, when the U.S. simply says “[a]ll right, 
Mr. Soviet, we are stepping out; take what you want. You have got the arms over there; 
you can overpower these people if you want to, you can establish military bases if you 
like. We have no further interest.”12 Kissinger also threw his weight against the Tunney 
Amendment, blustering that “[w]e have to be extremely tough, even brutal when they 
[the Soviets] step over the line.”13 
 Although the anti-Tunney forces pressed their point vehemently, they could not 
surmount the pervasive and overwhelming attitude of congressional wariness. Tunney 
was able to rally a support base so strong that he essentially rode roughshod over even the 
president’s entreaties. The lessons of Vietnam were too fresh, the Senate was too 
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Democratic, and the CIA had gone too far in its campaign to exclude the Senate from 
policy decisions. Tunney’s main theme in defense of his amendment was the post-
Vietnam need to keep the executive on a tight leash. “The Constitution makes it very 
clear that Congress has the power to make war,” Tunney argued on the day of the vote. 
“Yet, in recent years we have lost that power to a considerable extent by the executive 
branch taking unilateral action and then presenting Congress with a fait accompli.” 
“From now on,” he declared, “we should not allow the executive branch of government 
to engage the United States, directly or indirectly, in military actions in any part of the 
world without the prior approval of Congress.”14 Senator James McClure (R-ID), for his 
part, reacted negatively to the CIA’s practice of keeping the Congress as ill-informed as 
possible, viewing it as a slight to the entire institution. “[T]he administration . . . 
believe[s] they can still, on sensitive matters, brief only a few Members of the Senate and 
have their policies adopted without a full and open discussion in the Senate of the United 
States,” McClure declaimed. He argued for the Tunney Amendment as a way to re-
establish the legislature’s constitutionally equal standing, warning the administration “in 
all of its departments and agencies” that they “must bring the Senate of the United States 
into the discussion and give us the facts by which we can make our own determination.”15 
 Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), in a lucid argument remarkable for its lack of cold 
war hysteria, pointed out the futility of wasting money on Angola when that country was 
of so little economic and strategic significance to either the Soviet Union or America. 
After noting that nationalist forces had been fighting in Angola for over a decade without 
America’s or Russia’s aid, Pell asked why Angola had suddenly become such a 
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geopolitical hotspot. Answering his own question, Pell observed that “increased 
American concern in Angola appears to result from increased Soviet involvement in 
Angola. The United States has been caught reacting to Soviet initiatives, while the goals 
of American policy remain undefined.” Instead of squabbling with the Soviets for 
Angola, Pell argued, America’s time would be far better spent designing a coherent 
policy for the post-Vietnam world, a task Ford’s administration had not even attempted. 
“Today, more than 20 years since the initial American involvement in Vietnam,” Pell 
pointed out, “it seems that the foreign policy of the United States is still guided by the 
philosophy of containment. Yet cold war perceptions of global strategy and ‘zero sum’ 
competition with the Soviet Union bear little relevance to a situation dictated mostly by 
local loyalties defined primarily by region and tribe.” What happened in Angola, Pell 
contended, was of minor significance when compared to the fact that the most powerful 
nation in the world still based its foreign policy on antiquated ideals that had been put to 
shame in Vietnam. 
 Almost as soon as Pell finished his remarks, the Senate passed the Tunney 
Amendment 54-22 in what the New York Times termed a “clear-cut loss for President 
Ford.”16 Indeed, Ford immediately issued a statement calling the decision a “deep tragedy 
for all countries whose security depends upon the United States. Ultimately, it will 
profoundly affect the security of our country as well.” “This abdication of responsibility 
by a majority of the Senate,” Ford claimed “will have the gravest consequences for the 
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long-term position of the United States and for international order in general.”17 As the 
New York Times pointed out, however, the Senate action was “not conclusive, since the 
House still has an opportunity to reject the amendment.”18 With the debate on the Tunney 
Amendment to commence in mid-January, 1976, Ford turned his attention to winning the 
second round. 
 In a letter to the speaker of the House dated January 27, 1976, Ford emphasized 
the importance of America’s operations in Angola. The president insisted that “[t]he US 
cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms 
can be used for a blatant intervention in local conflicts, in areas thousands of miles from 
Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historic national interest.” To 
acquiesce in such meddling, he claimed, would “send a message of irresolution not only 
to the leaders of African nations but to United States allies and friends throughout the 
world.” Ford maintained that “resistance to Soviet expansion by military means must be a 
fundamental element of US foreign policy.”19 Yet in spite of Ford’s strong words and 
dire predictions, the House overwhelmingly voted (323-99) to approve the Tunney 
Amendment. The debate lasted just over one hour.20 House Speaker Carl Albert (D-OK), 
according to the New York Times, was “scornful,” calling Ford’s plea “a typical Ford 
                                                 
17 President Gerald R. Ford, “Remarks on Senate Action to Prohibit United States Assistance to Angola,” 
December 19, 1975, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1975, V. II 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1977) p. 1,981 
18 Binder, p. 1. 
19 President Gerald R. Ford, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Situation in 
Angola,” January 27, 1976, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1976 
V. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1979) pp. 93-94 
20 David Binder, “Aid to Angolans Ended by House in Rebuff to Ford,” New York Times, January 28, 1976 
p. 3. 
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operation – wave your hand, make a gesture, and that’s the end of it.”21 Congress, Ford 
stated, “had lost its nerve.”22 
 
Rebuff: Political Implications 
 By March 1976, both the FNLA and UNITA had ceased to exist as viable fighting 
forces in Angola, having been decimated by the Cuban-backed MPLA war machine. 
Although remnants of the anti-Soviet parties reverted to a guerrilla war that continued 
well into the 1990s, the MPLA, with its communist handlers, had won. By late March the 
Boeing airplane company was already selling 737 jetliners to the MPLA and Gulf Oil had 
resumed pumping. CIA Director William Colby and Deputy Director of Operations 
William Nelson retired.23 For most Americans, little had changed. In terms of the control 
of U.S. foreign policy, however, everything had changed. In historian Stephen Ambrose’s 
words, the passage of the Tunney Amendment was the first “example of Congress taking 
charge of foreign policy in a way unthinkable in the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, or 
Johnson years.”24  
After his plea was rejected, President Ford bitterly complained that the Congress 
had lost its nerve but, in reality, Congress, starting with the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution in 1970, had finally found the nerve it had lost over twenty years previous. Far 
from displaying a weak stomach in the face of communist aggression, Congress had 
stood up to the power of a cold war president and asserted its constitutional right to 
supervise foreign policy, whether covert or overt. While a parallel between Congress’ 
                                                 
21 Cited in ibid., p. 1. 
22 Ford, p. 359. 
23 Stockwell, p. 241. 
24 Ambrose, p. 289. 
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refusal to allow U.S. intervention in Angola and Congress’ refusal to allow Eisenhower 
to intervene on France’s behalf in the battle of Dien Bien Phu can be drawn, the two 
episodes bear scant resemblance to each other. Eisenhower had little intention of 
intervening, and never specifically asked Congress for permission. Ford did ask—indeed, 
he asked twice—and used every means at his disposal to cajole concessions out of 
Congress for his covert programs in Angola. He even played the previously unbeatable 
cold war trump card, the need to check Soviet aggression and protect freedom. And he 





Despite the separation of governmental powers that the Constitution of the United 
States was written to codify and protect, the balance between these powers has always 
been subject to the international political environment, domestic fervor, fast-talking 
executives, and the perceived threat of invasion. The situational susceptibility of the 
Constitution has most clearly been illustrated in the pendulum-like swinging in the 
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches with respect to the 
power to take the country to war. Constitutionally vested in Congress, the power to 
declare war and commit troops has come under assault from strong-willed executives 
ever since President Monroe, General Jackson, and Congress unwittingly conspired to 
establish the precedent of an executive with the power to make war in the early 1800s. 
The cold war, bringing with it a threat of the spread of communism and instant 
annihilation, provided Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson with the political 
clout they needed to all but eliminate the checks and balances established by the 
Constitution. Following the Korean War and the Formosa, Middle East, and Tonkin Gulf 
Resolutions, the legislature was clearly in the habit of automatically acquiescing to any 
cold war president’s foreign policy requests. 
 By the end of the Vietnam War, with the nation in turmoil over America’s 
continued presence in Southeast Asia, the Congress finally woke to find that two decades 
of submission had bloated presidential power far beyond the scope of the Constitution 
and left Congress with very little influence over the supervision of America’s foreign 
policy. The only recourse available to a Congress that had knowingly underwritten its 
own superfluity was to shake off the cobwebs of inaction, put the rubber stamp back in 
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the cupboard, and act the part of the executive’s equal. Since the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
of 1964, with its imprecise wording and drastic expansion of presidential war-making 
powers, represented the height of the executive’s ascendancy over its legislative 
counterpart, the 1970 repeal of the very same resolution served as the repudiation of over 
two decades of congressional compliance. The debate surrounding the Dole Amendment 
and the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution showed that Congress was indeed taking the 
Foreign Military Sales Bill and turning it into just such an opportunity. Consequently, the 
Dole Amendment served as the legislative ultimatum that was necessary to shrug off the 
chains of cold war alarmism and executive dominance in order to reassume the balance of 
power dictated by the Constitution. 
 The Tunney Amendment, following the Dole Amendment by five years, was the 
first and primary example of the bold legacy of the 91st Congress. The repudiation of 
presidential foreign policy in Angola made the Tunney Amendment a watershed moment 
in American political history. Sitting comfortably in what had come to be a near imperial 
presidency and in spite of documented communist aggression, President Ford was denied 
his war in Angola. Congress’ curbing of presidential power in 1975 was manifestly a 
legacy of the 1970 denial of presidential war-making power, the Dole Amendment.  
In fact, the epochal events of 1970 continued to affect the exercise of foreign 
policy throughout the rest of the twentieth century. When President Ronald Reagan 
wanted to intervene in Central America, Congress turned him down, despite Reagan’s 
efforts to portray such intervention as a “defense of freedom.” Although President 
George H.W. Bush was able to obtain a congressional declaration of war for the First 
Gulf War, the declaration only passed by a slim margin, and after vigorous debate. The 
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precedent of Congress rubber stamping a presidential bid for the power to make war 
would not reemerge until 2002, with Congress’ joint resolution to go to war in Iraq, 
following the traumatic events of September 11, 2001. That it took an attack on the scale 
of Pearl Harbor to jolt Congress out of its independent track and back into the executive’s 
camp is a tribute to the lasting effects of 1970 and the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution. 
 While diplomatic historians, on the whole, note the growing role and importance 
of Congress in the conduct of America’s foreign policy in the decades following the early 
1970s, they habitually date the inception of congressional oversight of presidential 
foreign policy three years too late, with the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973. 
Although the War Powers Act codified the growing sentiment in Congress that the 
president had far exceeded his constitutional prerogatives after a two-decade campaign to 
whittle away congressional responsibilities, the first evidence of congressional defiance 
was in 1970, not 1973, with the repeal of the resolution that represented all Congress had 
willingly given up and all the dangers that abdication represented. By repealing the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Congress pointedly signaled its unwillingness to hand over its 
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